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CAN THE EU DELIVER THE AREA 
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? 
EPIN WORKING PAPER NO. 9/SEPTEMBER 2003 
ADAM TOWNSEND
* 
In 1997, the European Union set out the broad aims of its next big project: the construction of 
an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. The EU has set itself a task at least as ambitious as 
the single market project. To guarantee freedom and justice, while enhancing security, the EU 
will have to do the following: make national criminal laws more similar; make national police 
forces and prosecutors work together more effectively; build a common border guard; develop 
common asylum and visa policies; make the EU courts more efficient; guarantee the rights of 
individuals and ensure that EU agencies are accountable for their actions. In order for the EU 
to be able to make these politically sensitive and far-reaching reforms, the member states 
must give the European Union more power to make and enforce laws in these areas. 
The measures the EU is taking to build the area of freedom, security and justice fall into a 
policy area known as justice and home affairs (JHA). But a number of factors make it difficult 
for the Union to make effective justice and home affairs policies. For example, member states 
must agree unanimously in order to make most decisions, which makes policy-making 
tortuously long. Moreover, the EU treaties’ confusing legal structure spreads JHA policies 
across all three of the Union’s ‘pillars’ and applies different procedures to policy-making in 
each pillar.  
In 2001, European heads of government decided to establish ‘The Convention on the Future 
of Europe’ to prepare a single draft Constitutional Treaty to replace the patchwork of treaties 
that currently set out the way in which the EU is run. The Convention was a prime 
opportunity for the member states to empower the EU to build the promised area of freedom, 
security and justice. Many commentators considered the justice and home affairs machinery 
especially ripe for reform.  
The Convention completed a draft of the Constitutional Treaty in July of this year. At the next 
stage, an intergovernmental conference (IGC) will debate the treaty and present a final 
version to heads of state and government for signature in 2004. There is a risk that national 
governments will try to make large-scale changes to the draft treaty at the IGC. Whether they 
do or not, the new Constitutional Treaty, if successfully ratified, would become the most 
important EU document, codifying what the Union can and cannot do, and how it should do 
it. 
The new draft Constitutional Treaty lays a stronger foundation for the area of freedom, 
security and justice, but it does not make the step change that many think necessary. On the 
positive side, the draft treaty would:  
•  allow the Union to apply only one procedure when it makes JHA laws and policies – 
which should make policy-making faster and more coherent; 
•  require the Council, which brings together national ministers to approve EU decisions, to 
use qualified majority voting rather than unanimity when voting on most JHA legislation 
– which should speed up decision-making; 
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•  expand the role of the European Parliament in JHA law-making, which will enhance 
democratic scrutiny of JHA decisions; 
•  strengthen the legal impact of Union legislation in member states by giving laws more 
direct effect; 
•  extend the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to cover JHA, which would 
strengthen the rule of law at the EU level; 
•  incorporate the Charter of Fundamental Rights and codify other rights and principles of 
Union law, which would strengthen the formal protection of citizens’ rights; and 
•  bring the emerging European police office Europol within the EU’s treaty framework, 
which means the Union could monitor and reform it more easily. 
In its current form, however, the treaty would not give the EU enough power to deliver the 
area of freedom, security and justice. Europe needs to do much more to address major cross-
border issues such as crime and international terrorism. The EU needs to regulate migration 
and reform its judiciaries to cope with the creation of the area of free movement and the 
resulting increase in cases with cross-border elements. These issues are beyond the ability of 
any individual member state to control. EU leaders readily admit this, but many national 
governments are unwilling to accept that addressing this situation will mean pooling more 
sovereignty at the EU level.  
Politicians throughout Europe continually bemoan the Union’s ineffectiveness and its 
inability to deliver. But in the case of the draft Constitutional Treaty, it is the member states 
that have failed to deliver a more effective Union. This is surprising and regrettable. This 
paper looks superficially at the extent to which the draft Constitutional Treaty would improve 
the EU’s ability to build the area of freedom, security and justice. It considers the impact of 
the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the proposed reforms to the EU 
courts, the changes to the internal security powers of the EU and proposals for the 
harmonisation of national criminal laws. 
Progress so far  
The Union has made only slow progress in constructing the ‘area of freedom, security and 
justice’ promised in 1997. At Tampere in 1999, heads of government fleshed out what 
building the area would entail. The Tampere agenda, as it came to be known, contained a 
number of targets and deadlines. Nevertheless, four years on, the Union has not delivered on 
the agenda, and the elements it has delivered are mostly incomplete or unsatisfactory.  
The EU has developed only the vaguest outline of an immigration policy, while making 
slightly more progress on building a European asylum system. Although it is 18 years since 
the founding members of the Schengen area signed the original agreement to remove border 
controls, Schengen still lacks an effective policing system. While Tampere remains 
undelivered, the challenges are not diminishing. It has become very clear that migration is 
going to reshape societies in the 21
st century as much as it has in past centuries. And 
transnational ‘soft security’ threats like organised crime and international terrorism are not 
subsiding.  
With the creation of the Schengen zone, organised crime gangs and terrorists can now operate 
across the Union in the same way that they can operate across the United States. Western 
intelligence agencies confirm that Abu Dahdah, the al-Qaeda operative who supported some 
of the 11 September hijackers while they resided in Hamburg, travelled widely throughout 
Europe during period leading up to the attacks. Al-Qaeda members met several times in Spain 
during the planning of the attacks. And after the attacks, police rolled up al-Qaeda related  C AN THE EU DELIVER THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? 
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cells in Italy, Belgium, Spain, Britain and France. This suggests that al-Qaeda had already 
adjusted itself to take advantage of the lack of border controls within the Schengen area. But 
member states have not done the same. They still organise their police forces, prosecution 
services and judiciaries at the national level.  
As a result, police forces cannot cross borders as easily as the criminals and terrorists they 
pursue. And once police forces do arrest suspects involved in cross-border crime, prosecutors 
find it hard to convict them, because identifying and collecting evidence and witnesses from 
different member states is legally complicated, time-consuming and expensive. The German 
prosecutors of four terrorists who had planned to bomb the Christmas market in Strasbourg in 
2000 had to drop some criminal charges – including those of belonging to a terrorist 
organisation – partly because they could not easily bring evidence and witnesses from France.  
Moreover, member states define and punish the same crime in different ways. So individuals 
who belong to the same criminal organisation, but who are arrested in different member states 
will be prosecuted by different authorities in separate cases and may receive different 
punishments for the same crimes. One Italian prosecutor described this as “jurisdiction 
fall[ing] behind criminality”. This can undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial 
system. A single area of justice would imply, as a minimum, more or less the same outcome 
for the same act throughout the area of freedom, security and justice.  
The removal of internal border controls also means that together, the 15 Schengen states rely 
upon the remaining external border controls to keep out the people and goods they do not 
want. If Schengen members share the same external border, then they should also pool their 
border control efforts. At present, each member state takes responsibility for controlling their 
section of Schengen’s external border. More significantly, they do so using different methods, 
different equipment and with varying standards.  
So why, if there is such a pressing need, has the Union failed to deliver? The answer lies in a 
tangle of political, institutional and practical reasons. First, police, criminal law, human rights 
and the administration of justice are politically very sensitive issues that national politicians 
are reluctant to relinquish any control over. Second, the national institutions and lobby groups 
involved are powerful and not natural Europhiles. Ministries of the interior and justice, for 
example, are influential and inward-looking institutions, while lawyers and judges are often 
amongst the most conservative members of society. Third, the member states practice law 
enforcement in very different ways and have very different criminal laws and procedures. 
This makes it difficult in practical terms for police officers and prosecutors in different states 
to exchange information and do joint investigations and prosecutions easily. And because 
there is such variety in national legal systems, it is difficult for the EU to convince courts not 
to question the decisions of courts in other member states. Finally, as mentioned above, the 
EU does not have the power to make effective laws rapidly, or the institutions to implement 
and enforce them.  
Some commentators predicted that the events of 11 September 2001 would dissolve 
nationalist instincts in Europe and push the member states to radically reform the way the 
European Union makes and implements justice and home affairs policies. The Convention 
began its work at a time when member states were regularly uncovering suspected terrorist 
cells. Hence, it was no surprise that in December 2002 the Convention’s justice and home 
affairs working group handed an ambitious final report to the praesidium. The Convention’s 
first draft of the JHA articles closely followed the working group’s recommendations. For a 
time, it looked as though the member states had successfully used the political momentum  A DAM TOWNSEND 
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generated by 11 September and the opportunity provided by the Convention to give the EU 
the powers to develop the promised ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. 
But national governments have been growing progressively uneasy about proposed increases 
in EU powers in the JHA field. The draft Constitutional Treaty that the Convention completed 
in July 2003 reduced the EU’s powers from the high-water mark set by the praesidium’s 
earlier draft. In the time between the two drafts, the more cautious member states won many 
concessions.  
The latest draft maintains the key positive reforms – abolishing the separate pillars, 
incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights, increasing the involvement of the European 
Parliament and the use of qualified majority voting on justice and home affairs issues. But it 
also gives the member states room to block, avoid or water down future Union proposals.  
As a result, the Union would have a better foundation for the area of freedom, security and 
justice, but would still lack the power to drive through a Tampere II. After enlargement, 
pressure will build quickly on member states to return to the treaty and strengthen the EU’s 
powers to address the added challenges a bigger, more complicated Union will face.  
The draft Constitutional Treaty would strengthen freedom – and increase uncertainty 
The drafters of the Constitutional Treaty should be proud; the draft treaty proposes reforms 
that would increase the emphasis on rights and increase oversight of the EU institutions and 
agencies. Unfortunately, some member states insisted on amendments that have made the 
impact of the treaty unclear. This could increase litigation and reduce the popularity of the 
treaty, as citizens are not going to try to read complicated legal explanations about how to 
interpret the treaty. The uncertainty also makes it difficult to judge the extent to which the 
Union’s draft Constitution would actually protect rights. Much will depend on how the 
European Court of Justice interprets the rights provisions in the treaty. 
The European Union’s draft treaty is full of provisions giving formal protection to human 
rights – it even repeats some rights twice. Article 2 of the draft confirms that one of the 
Union’s core values is respect for human rights and draft Article 7 of Part I lays down the 
three main planks of the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights: 
•  The draft treaty incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights in full as Part II of the 
treaty. 
•  Draft Article 7 empowers the Union to seek to accede to the European Convention on 
human rights.  
•  Paragraph 3 of draft Article 7 would make fundamental rights “general principles of the 
Union’s law”.  
The draft also repeats the special rights that EU citizens receive from the Union and the 
prohibition against discrimination. These include the rights of citizens to move and reside 
freely throughout the Union and to vote and stand in elections for the European Parliament in 
the member state in which they reside. 
The draft treaty would also strengthen oversight of the Union’s institutions and agencies. 
The treaty would give national parliaments a role in scrutinising Europol and Eurojust, the 
EU’s fledgling police and prosecutor’s offices respectively. The European ombudsman would 
have an explicit remit to follow up on complaints about EU institutions, bodies and agencies. 
This would enshrine the current practice. The alternative wording – “EU institutions” – is 
narrower, and could exclude some EU agencies and bodies, whose activities impact heavily  C AN THE EU DELIVER THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? 
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on human rights, like Europol and Eurojust. The jurisdiction of the ECJ would also be 
extended to allow it to hear cases concerning laws made on justice and home affairs. 
National governments have debated for some time whether they should make the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights legally binding. Despite serious reservations from the UK government, 
whose former Minister for Europe Keith Vaz famously said that the Charter would be ‘as 
binding as Beano’, the draft Constitutional Treaty would make the Charter legally binding. 
Nevertheless, the Convention had to agree on a number of compromises to the text that make 
it very difficult to gauge what influence the Charter would actually have over the lives of the 
citizens and residents of the EU.  
Some governments, such as the UK, Denmark and Ireland, are worried about attacks by 
critics at home, who say the Charter is an underhanded way of passing sovereignty to 
Brussels. The UK government is running contradictory domestic and European policies on the 
Charter, which is having damaging results in both arenas. To its European partners, the UK 
government has indicated it intends to continue to fight to restrict the influence of the Charter 
all the way to the end of the intergovernmental conference. This annoys other governments 
that consider the incorporation of the Charter to be a ‘done deal’ – as well as something that 
could be popular with EU citizens. On the home front, the UK government is attempting to 
maintain the fiction that incorporating the Charter would change nothing. We can expect 
government representatives to make more ‘Beano’ comments, ‘business as usual’ claims and 
‘tidying up exercise’ statements, which, when ridiculed by the media, help to increase public 
scepticism about the whole draft treaty.  
The UK government is right to be worried about the lack of public support for the Charter. 
Much of the British public thinks the Charter could be an EU ‘Trojan horse’. One headline in 
Britain’s Sun newspaper of 27 May claimed that incorporating the Charter would cost Britain 
2 million jobs. British suspicions about the Charter are based on more than irresponsible 
media reports. They also reflect the fact that the UK does not have a modern bill of rights – or 
even a written constitution. Moreover, explicit written limitations on the power of government 
sit uneasily with the UK doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Ultimately, if the British 
public do not want to accept the principles and values contained in the Charter, their 
government should not force them to do so. 
The consensus in the Convention for making the Charter legally binding was very broad. So 
the members that were opposed switched tactics and attempted to ‘ring-fence’ the operation of 
the Charter as far as possible. The most potent amendment is a draft article which establishes 
a distinction between rights and principles. Principles, the draft article asserts, “may  be 
implemented by legislative acts”, which suggests they are optional. Crucially, the Charter 
does not say which articles are principles and which ones are rights. The IGC should clarify 
the distinction between rights and principles, and spell out which articles are principles and 
which are rights. 
Other amendments would have little practical effect and were inserted mostly for political 
reasons. These include a draft article assuring that the Charter would only apply to EU 
legislation and not to purely national laws, and a provision stating that the Charter should not 
become a back-door method of giving the EU new powers over member states. In addition, 
phrases in the Charter like “in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices” 
are intended to prevent contentious articles from altering national law. The phrase appears in 
articles enshrining the right to conclude collective wage agreements, the right to strike and the 
right to receive social security benefits. Yet the Charter would only apply to EU law, and the 
EU cannot make laws about issues such as when national workers can and cannot strike.   A DAM TOWNSEND 
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Some of the Charter’s detractors base their arguments on a misreading of the document and/or 
a lack of understanding of how national and EU courts are likely to apply the rights in 
practice. Few rights are absolute: most are restricted by other considerations that can form 
specific or general exceptions to their operation. For example, libel laws restrict the right to 
free speech in most democracies, and firemen in Germany do not have the right to strike 
because of the danger to public safety. The US and UK courts – and the European Court of 
Human Rights – have even, in the context of fighting terrorism, allowed their governments to 
breach the prohibition on detention without trial. So commentators should not read the 
Charter in the abstract. To interpret the Charter, readers should consider not only the 
limitations other parts of the draft treaty impose upon it, but also the restrictions and 
exceptions the courts are likely to apply in interpreting it. 
It is bewildering that some national governments are so opposed to embedding human rights 
and freedoms in the fabric of the European Union. All European national governments now 
proclaim themselves to be the protectors of freedom and justice. So why oppose strengthening 
the protection of rights within the EU? Apart from the legal and political importance of 
incorporating the Charter, a single list of rights would also make the Union more 
understandable and popular with its citizens. The US Bill of Rights makes US citizens aware 
and proud of their rights, and every French schoolchild learns about the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man.  
The uncertainty surrounding the Charter and other rights provisions in the draft treaty is bad 
for citizens and for the popularity of the Union, but it is also makes the legal impact of the 
Charter uncertain. A strong legal foundation for human rights would make it easier for courts 
throughout Europe to build a single framework of human rights law as part of EU and 
national law, with fewer contradictions and clearer principles than the variety of sources that 
exist now. Moreover, member states, by injecting lots of uncertainty into the operation of the 
Charter, have hurt their own cause. They have handed some of the initiative for defining the 
balance of power between member states and the EU institutions over to the vagaries of 
litigation in the European Court of Justice. 
It is unclear whether the ECJ will interpret the Charter in such a way as to indirectly increase 
the powers of the EU institutions at the expense of national governments. The ECJ has 
traditionally been a force for integration in the EU. But although the rights in the EU treaties 
have guided the Court’s decisions throughout its history, the ECJ has been far less of an 
activist than the US Supreme Court and has rarely struck down legislation on the grounds that 
it breaches rights.  
Balanced against this is the constitutional history of federal states like Germany, the US and 
Australia. The experience in those countries suggests that when federal courts interpret rights 
granted by a federal constitution, over time, it tends to result in a transfer of power upwards. 
If this proves true for the European Court of Justice, the Charter of Fundamental Rights could 
become one of the defining elements of the European Union. Regardless of whether the ECJ 
maintains the current balance of power between the Union and its member states or not, the 
Charter should exert a steady, positive influence over the legislation and behaviour of the 
European Union, its institutions and agencies. 
‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ 
The Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty continues the cautious reforms member states 
made to the European Court of Justice at Nice in 2000 – and would make the EU slightly 
more just. The draft treaty would reinforce the rights of persons who are on trial; increase the 
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align national criminal law systems to make member states treat the same crime in more or 
less the same way. The draft would, however, greatly increase the caseload of the already 
overburdened EU courts without reforming the court system to cope. If the courts cannot 
administer the law effectively and efficiently in practice, then it does not matter how just and 
noble the draft Constitutional Treaty is. 
In many ways, the European Court of Justice has been the most successful and the most 
federal of the EU’s institutions. These two attributes are linked, because the court has a clear 
and independent mandate compared with the International Court of Justice, which settles 
disputes between states but issues only advisory decisions and is widely considered by 
international lawyers to be ineffectual. The few citizens who know the European Court of 
Justice exists tend to respect it. The ECJ’s biggest problem is its slowness: it can take two 
years for it to make a preliminary ruling on a question referred by a national court. There are 
four additional factors that will increase the Court’s caseload over the next decade and 
suggest that national governments should make the court more efficient now.  
First, the Charter of Fundamental Rights could generate a lot of litigation as plaintiffs test out 
its limits and meaning. The member states have made litigation more likely by making the 
operation and interpretation of the Charter unclear.  
Second, enlargement will expand the regular caseload of the EU courts simply because there 
will be a third more countries doing battle in the EU court system. The Commission may also 
need to bring cases against new member states to force them to iron out some of the 
remaining wrinkles in their compliance with the acquis – especially on state aid and the 
protection of some industries. If enlargement drives another round of consolidation in 
industry, then this could lead to more disputes about the Commission’s competition rulings. 
The courts of the new members are also less experienced with EU law and may request more 
preliminary rulings from the EU courts.  
Third, the adoption of the new Constitutional Treaty could make the overall Union legal 
framework more uncertain for a time, which could lead to an increase in disputes. A measure 
of uncertainty and settling-in would be expected with constitutional engineering on this scale, 
but the member states could have helped by doing a better job of making the draft treaty 
clearer. The subsidiarity principle and the provisions on competences (what the EU can do, 
what member states can do and what is shared), for example, are likely to generate a lot of 
litigation.  
Fourth the draft Constitutional Treaty expands the court’s jurisdiction to cover almost all of 
justice and home affairs, which is a very contentious and sensitive area, and one in which the 
EU is expected to generate lots of new laws and possibly institutions over the coming years, 
such as border guard and cybercrime agencies. 
In line with the Nice Treaty, the draft Constitution sets out three levels of federal courts. The 
European Court of Justice remains the supreme court of the Union, and its function is largely 
unchanged – to interpret the treaties and provide rulings on important questions of EU law. 
The draft treaty would rename the Court of First Instance the ‘High Court’. The draft treaty 
would allow the Union to establish ‘specialised courts’ below the High Court to hear cases in 
certain specific areas of law – intellectual property for example. The Union should establish 
these specialised courts immediately (the Nice Treaty of 2000 already permits this) to test 
whether they would improve the administration of justice or not.  
The draft treaty would also restrict the ability of persons to appeal from the High Court to the 
ECJ, which should help reduce the ECJ’s caseload. These changes add up to a half-hearted 
attempt to reduce the overload, but do not go far enough. Citizens must ultimately go to the  A DAM TOWNSEND 
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courts to enforce their rights. If they cannot get timely justice from the court system because it 
is overloaded, then fancy constitutional provisions protecting human rights are pointless. 
Currently, it is very difficult for individuals to challenge EU legislation in front of the ECJ. 
The rule for ‘standing’ – the legal term for the right to bring a case in front of a court – is that 
the person must have both a ‘direct and individual concern’. The courts have interpreted the 
rule very narrowly. The draft treaty would maintain the current ‘direct and individual 
concern’ test for standard legislation, but would make it easier for individuals to challenge so-
called ‘delegated acts’. The Commission would make delegated acts under an authority 
granted by a regular EU law. The rationale for making it easier for individuals to challenge 
delegated acts for breaches of the Constitutional Treaty is that they are implemented without 
going through the full democratic review process. So they should be subject to enhanced 
judicial review. Citizens affected by Union legislation would thus find it easier to seek justice. 
The draft treaty confirms the supremacy of EU law over national law. Some national 
politicians were up in arms when this draft clause emerged, announcing that it represented the 
final takeover of the nation-state by Brussels. Nevertheless, and apparently to the surprise of 
national politicians across Europe, this draft article correctly reflects the situation as it has 
been at least since 1964. (In one Convention meeting, a representative from one national 
government asked that, although all present were aware the draft clause accurately reflected 
reality, to avoid alarming the public, could the Convention please avoid spelling this out so 
clearly?) 
As the single market deepens and people move freely across borders, the volume of court 
cases with a cross-border element is increasing. To deal with such cases, the European Union 
needs to knit the national civil law systems together more closely. The Union’s ultimate aim 
is to ensure that courts throughout Europe efficiently enforce laws that concern cross-border 
issues according to common procedures. This is one part of the ‘area of justice’ and implies 
far-reaching reforms.  
The Union has to make the decisions of judicial authorities in one member state valid and 
binding throughout the Union. For example, if a court in Spain decides a child should live 
with its mother in a custody case, courts in other countries should not be able to come to 
different conclusions. This should apply not only to final judgements, but also to the 
procedural decisions that courts make along the way to reaching a final decision. For 
example, if, during a dispute about an alleged non-payment, a German court orders the 
freezing of a defendant’s assets contained in a bank account in Portugal, then the Portuguese 
authorities should do so immediately, rather than allowing the defendant to appeal to a 
Portuguese court. The owner of the bank account can of course still dispute the decision in the 
usual way in Germany. 
The EU also needs to reform criminal law to deal with cross-border crime, especially now 
that there are no border controls between Schengen members. The draft treaty provides a 
definitive list of such crimes – which include money-laundering, terrorism, drug and arms 
trafficking, corruption and computer crime. This is one area where member states seem to 
have their heads in the sand. The challenge of making criminal law work in an area of free 
movement with 17 different national systems is massive, and the draft treaty would not give 
the EU the powers to make effective reforms.  
The draft treaty would extend qualified majority voting into some aspects of policy-making in 
the field of criminal law – which should speed up law-making there. But, the draft treaty 
requires unanimity in several areas that could slow down the Union’s ability to respond to  C AN THE EU DELIVER THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? 
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changes in criminal behaviour. For example, the Council must agree unanimously to extend 
the list of cross-border crimes that the EU may define.  
Crucially, the draft treaty would restrict the Union to using laws that leave member states with 
lots of room to water down their intended effect or would not align member states’ practices 
enough. This aspect of the draft Constitutional Treaty reflects the belief of national 
governments that the best way to improve the Union’s ability to prosecute cross-border crime 
is to make national criminal justice systems ‘interoperable’. Simply put, this requires two 
things: member states must ensure that their courts recognise each others’ decisions – the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’. And, to  some extent, member states must smooth out 
differences between the way their laws define and punish crime, and the way they run their 
prosecutions and trials – a process called approximation.  
The governmental debate is about how far ‘some extent’ should go. Germany, Belgium and 
France support harmonisation. They argue that member states should reform their national 
criminal codes to adopt the same definitions for serious cross-border crimes and the same 
criminal procedures for the courts trying them. The UK, Ireland and others prefer the looser 
approximation method: to agree at the EU level the upper and lower limits for the definition 
of crimes and their penalties, and to ensure that national courts recognise each other’s 
decisions. The draft Constitutional Treaty’s approach to criminal law reform thus mostly 
reflects the UK government’s preference over Germany’s preferred method. 
Some lawyers, however, including some within the UK’s cabinet office, question whether 
approximation and mutual recognition are going to work in practice. First, the member states 
have very different criminal laws and procedures that often conflict, so governments will have 
to overhaul national laws more than they are currently letting on. For example, in Italy courts 
may try a person in their absence. In other member states, this is illegal. So a German court 
will not recognise the verdict of an Italian court that is unconstitutional in Germany.  
Second, in practice, the minimum procedural rules may not be good enough for the courts, 
because rules vary drastically around the Union – especially between the UK and Ireland and 
the continent. This makes it possible that a UK prosecutor’s case could fail because the court 
will refuse to accept evidence that has been gathered in France under French procedures, or 
because Catalan police detained a suspect for 72 hours, which could be a denial of rights in 
the UK and result in the court setting the suspect free. Defence lawyers will continue to use 
inconsistencies to thwart prosecutions until member states iron out the inconsistencies – 
which sounds a lot like harmonisation. If there is a good chance the member states will have 
to harmonise some of their criminal laws anyway, why not give the EU the power to begin the 
process now and save the agony of decades of watching defendants go free on procedural 
grounds? 
Creating European Union security 
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. 
‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (the draft EU security strategy) 
Some people argue that the EU has no business being involved in fighting terrorists and 
criminals. They say sensitive security matters such as these should be left to the nation-states. 
There is a simple reason why the Union should play a role. Organised crime and international 
terrorist groups are transnational issues par excellence:  no individual member state can 
address organised crime and international terrorist groups as effectively as when the member 
states work together.   A DAM TOWNSEND 
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The draft Constitutional Treaty would make it easier for the Union to make better policies for 
organised crime and terrorism more rapidly. The treaty streamlines the existing messy JHA 
law-making procedures and would allow the EU to use qualified majority voting on most JHA 
issues.  
The draft treaty proposes other positive reforms. It would put Europol on a much firmer legal 
basis within the EU treaty structure, so that member states can reform and develop it more 
easily. The draft treaty also encourages more coordination between Europol and Eurojust, and 
makes frequent reference to the need for the Union to cooperate with non-member countries 
in order to make effective JHA policies. This is an important step, because many of the threats 
to the Union have their origins beyond its territory. But the draft treaty leaves it to member 
states to decide what institutional changes may be necessary to make this possible.  
These are useful changes, but member states should go further. Member states, to get better at 
spotting threats, should work together more on gathering and assessing intelligence. This is 
important, because one of the causes of disagreements among member states about how to 
respond to issues like Hamas and Hizbollah – or Iran – is the fact that governments receive 
different information about their activities and assess it in different ways. The UK, because of 
its links with Israel and the US, sees more evidence on the depth of their terrorist activities.  
Member states should coordinate their intelligence-gathering by deploying their human and 
technological intelligence resources to reduce overlap. If they did this, they could cast their 
net more widely, i.e. spy on more of the world for the same amount of euros. There are huge 
practical and political challenges to making this work. The largest is trust. None of the big 
member states is ready to tell its spies to vacate another region (‘don’t worry chaps, you can 
all go home, the Germans will be covering the Ukraine from now on’), and rely totally on 
another member state to watch its back there. In some regions, however, one member state 
may have a clear lead in information-gathering and others could scale down their already 
smaller presence. France has good networks in North Africa for example, and it may be better 
if other services do not try to replicate those networks.  
During the Cold War, the US and the UK’s intelligence agencies used to have an 
understanding about who ‘owned’ which parts of the world. The US usually let the UK take 
the lead in most of its former colonies for example. Where one agency had priority, the other 
would, to a certain extent, trust its partner to pass on any relevant information. Although the 
US and UK intelligence agencies have an unusually high level of trust, it is possible that, over 
time, the Europeans could develop the same level of trust. 
Apart from coordinating their intelligence-gathering efforts, member states’ police and 
intelligence services should also share more assessments – on certain terrorist or organised 
crime groups for example, and on the risk presented by troubled states, like Moldova. And 
member states should also do more joint assessments. A joint assessment is where analysts 
from different countries work together to make a common assessment of a particular threat. 
The national police and intelligence officers seconded to Europol currently do a limited 
amount of common assessments. Joint assessments are difficult where the threat is politicised. 
It is impossible to imagine Britain, France and Germany sharing too many assessments about 
Iraq in the lead up to the invasion. But there should be fewer blocks to doing joint 
assessments of al-Qaeda-related threats or the threat posed by an arms trafficker, like the 
infamous ex-KGB trafficker Victor Bout, who the UN identified as a major supplier to 
conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Many different national bodies work on terrorism and organised crime. Apart from external 
intelligence agencies, the police, customs, the armed forces, security services and border  C AN THE EU DELIVER THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? 
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guards are all involved. There are also EU agencies and institutions, such as Europol, High 
Representative Javier Solana’s Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Political and Security 
Committee (COPS), the defence chiefs, the justice and home affairs ministers. At present, 
there is not enough coordination among the national agencies, or between the national and 
EU-level organisations. To rectify this, the draft treaty proposes a sort of internal security 
committee within the Council, to “facilitate coordination of the actions of member states’ 
competent authorities”.  
To achieve this sort of coordination, the Union needs more than a toothless standing 
committee staffed by low-ranking ministerial officials. Member states should create a 
European Security Council (ESC). It would have two tasks: first, to identify and analyse 
threats and propose responses to the European Council. Second, the European Security 
Council should drive reforms aimed at improving coordination among EU and national 
defence, law enforcement and security agencies. The ESC would absorb a lot of the security 
tasks currently performed by the High Representative for Foreign Policy. For example, the 
ESC should be responsible for drafting the annual EU security strategy. 
The Council president would chair the meetings and attendance at ESC meetings could 
depend on the meeting agenda. The highest-ranking representatives from the main security-
related bodies – external as well as internal – would be eligible to participate in ESC 
planning. This includes Europol, the JHA Council of Ministers, the new foreign minister, the 
defence chiefs, the chiefs of police task force and representatives nominated by the national 
security services and intelligence agencies. It would also possess a permanent staff.  
The structure of the ESC would reflect the nature of the main threats to the EU. Mr Solana’s 
draft security strategy identifies three primary threats – international terrorism, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states, and organised crime. All of 
these threaten the EU both from within and externally. To address these threats, the EU has to 
coordinate the work of national police forces and security services, which are typical justice 
and home affairs agencies, with the work of its diplomats, spies and armed forces.  
The member states must also strengthen existing EU agencies like Europol and Eurojust by 
continuing to push their national police services to feed Europol and Eurojust information, 
and to work with them on joint investigations and prosecutions. And in some areas, like 
border control and intelligence-assessment, Europe needs to create new agencies to improve 
EU-level capabilities and coordinate the work of national services. Again, the draft treaty does 
not push the EU far enough here. The enabling article for the widely demanded EU border 
guard agency is extremely weak. It calls for the “gradual establishment of an integrated 
management of external border control”, which does not establish a clear end-goal for the EU 
to deliver.  
The EU must, however, build the area of security on more than better institutional 
arrangements. Effective cooperation on the ground between the hundreds of national and 
regional law enforcement and security agencies is at least as important. 
The Union should continue to remove laws and other impediments that prevent law 
enforcement services from exchanging information about suspects, cases and threats, and 
doing more joint investigations. Aside from lowering legal barriers, the Union must provide 
the practical infrastructure for cooperation, such as links between computer systems, trusted 
translation facilities and common protocols for information exchange. The draft 
Constitutional Treaty makes it easier to create JHA laws, thus it improves the potential for 
making these reforms more rapidly. But it will take national politicians to put pressure on 
their police and customs officers to cooperate more internationally.  A DAM TOWNSEND 
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Ultimately, law enforcement officers will only work together if they trust one another and if 
they recognise that cooperation will help them get their job done better. So if French and 
German police officers do not trust one another or do not believe that cross-border 
cooperation can help get results, then they will not do joint investigations – regardless of 
whether a law exists that permits it or not.  
In this sense, the Union must also build the area of security from the bottom up. So it cannot 
rely on the methods used to construct the single market, which were largely built by 
promulgating laws from above. To knit together an area of security, the EU needs to intensify 
the exchange of law enforcement and security officers between national agencies, and to 
create more centres where law enforcement and security officers from different countries and 
forces work together on joint projects.  
At the moment, member states are mostly responsible for the exchange of law enforcement 
officers and the planning of joint operations and exercises – although the Union does provide 
funding through various mechanisms. The Union could consolidate some of these efforts into 
an EU programme, as a sort of ERASMUS for police officers. 
Bilateral and trilateral cooperation centres exist on many of the borders between EU member 
states. For example, successful centres are located on the French-German and Belgian-French 
borders. National governments set these centres up outside of the EU framework. Customs, 
police and immigration officers from both countries share an office and are charged with 
coordinating cross-border matters, such as investigations that involve both countries. More 
ambitiously, the Union has set up a permanent office hosted by the German government in 
Berlin, to assist cooperation between land border guards throughout the Union. These centres 
are very valuable because they combine a way to strengthen personal relations with the 
practical tools that make cross-border policing easier. The Union should create more of these 
throughout the Schengen area. 
Conclusion 
The European Union’s leaders have always been fond of promising grand things – but 
delivering them late. The penalty for delay in creating the single market is measured in lost 
opportunities to spur economic growth. The penalty for delay in building the area of freedom, 
security and justice could be an increase in crime, a reduction of confidence in the courts and 
an increase in insecurity on the part of Europeans. The member states must recognise that the 
area of freedom, security and justice is not optional, and use the IGC to give the Union the 
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